This piece examines how much should the federal budget be cut and where the major cuts should be.
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Dealing with Deficits and the Rise in Federal Spending
by Murray L. Weidenbaum At a time when, alas, economist jokes are in vogue, I would like to add my favorite wisecrack about our profession: if all the economists in the world were laid end to end, it might be a good thing. This sour remark is instigated by my having to listen to, and occasionally participate in, what seem to be endless debates on whether budget deficits really matter, and, if so, on what arcane basis of measurement. I finally have found a short cut that reconciles the great intellectual wisdom of our profession with the practical concerns of participants in and observers of financial markets. Thus, I conclude that deficits do not matter-but that Treasury borrowing and money creation surely do! Having disposed of this weighty subject so quickly, let me go on to examine several current policy questions relating to federal finance and to budget deficits. First, let us consider the nature of the changes made in federal outlays by the Reagan Administration and, second, let us analyze some of the economic implications, covering both military and civilian programs. This task, it turns out, is more complicated than one might expect.
How Much Has the Budget Been Cut?
To begin, it is difficult to directly compare the current estimates of outlays under the Reagan program with those contained in President Carter's last budget message, presented in January, 1981 
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the Carter reports out of our archives and ignoring military outlay increases c .9 More sophisticated comparisons can be made. For example, the comparison can be 2 3 restated in terms of constant dollars, using in each case the inflation assumptions that accompanied the respective current dollar estimates. The results based on the GNP deflators are contained in Table 2 . The differences between the two sets of projected outlays are very much smaller than in Table 1 , about $23 billion when viewed in real (deflated) terms over the period 1982-86 (or a little less than $5 billion a year). A variation of this theme is contained in Table 3 , where the CPI assumptions are used to adjust both sets of outlay projections. In this case, the results are more ambiguous. Using the CPI as a deflator, the aggregate estimates for fiscal years [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] under the Reagan programs are shown on balance to be a bit higher than the Carter estimates-by about $7 billion (or a little over $1 billion a year).
In relation to the 1981 tax cuts, net spending reductions have been modest
It does seem clear that, especially in relation to the 1981 tax cuts, the net spending reductions in the past 20 months are modest. It is not surprising, therefore, that current projections of the budget deficit for the next several years are unusually high. See Table 4 for estimates by the Congressional Budget Office that are in the neighborhood of $150 billion a year. Unofficial forecasts of the deficit in the next few years range up to $200 billion annually.
The Problem of Entitlements
When we probe beneath the aggregate spending levels, we find that "entitlements" or payments to individuals constitute the largest category of the budget. In recent years, entitlement payments also have been the most rapidly growing budget category. It therefore is quite appropriate that 4 Deficit -w ---.s2
increasing attention is being given to this area. I have little to add to the extensive public debate. I am, however, struck by the vast amount of ignorance attached to the largest entitlement, social security benefit payments. Given the current focus on reducing those outsized budget deficits, any discussion of possible change in social security outlays is immediately attacked as an effort to balance the budget on the backs of social security pensioners. It is true that facing the problem of social security financing would likely result in smaller budget deficits. But-and this fundamental point is usually ignored-even if the federal budget were in such great shape that we could declare dividends out of the surplus, we would still have to face the basic problem that the social security system is not adequately financed.
We must face the basic problem that the Social Security system is not adequately financed
Over the years, Congress has been more aggressive in voting benefit increases than in enacting the social security tax increases to pay for them. Also, demographic and economic trends have turned out in recent years to be more adverse than assumed in the system's actuarial calculations. Thus, the public debate on social security has the issue backwards: our attention is needed on the question of social security finance, not because of the budget deficits but to ensure that the program fully meets the disbursements to which it is committed. We must recognize, however, that although it is the largest single "entitlement program," social security is only one of many. A comprehensive budget restraint effort must take a hard look at the other components in this category, including veterans' pensions and government employees' retirement benefits.
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The Question of National Defense Spending Let us turn to the second largest category of budget outlays, national defense. Here we should acknowledge at the outset that there is a broad-based agreement on the need to expand U.S. national defense spending. Both the Carter and Reagan budgets projected significant growth in defense spending in real terms for each of the five fiscal years 1982-1986. The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) stated in its annual report accompanying the President's 1982 Economic Report, "any economic effects ... must be assessed in the context of the overriding need for maintaining the level of defense spending necessary for national security."
As would be expected, there has been considerable disagreement over the specifics of the buildup, including the question of how rapid an expansion in military spending is desirable. But it should be recognized that none of this is a debate between hawks and doves. Among the specific questions raised is the economic feasibility of the currently contemplated schedule of military outlays. Moreover, the
The defense buildup is not a "hawk vs. dove" issue so much as it is a question of economic feasibility
1981-82 recession has resulted in such substantial amounts of excess capacity in American industry that, at least for the next year or two, there is likely to be adequate capacity to meet military and civilian needs. But it is useful to look beyond, to the middle of the decade, when significant economic growth may coincide with the peak of the military buildup. In such circumstances, capacity questions would arise. The CEA annual report deals with that eventuality, pointing out three results of the defense buildup that can be anticipated:
1. The substantial transfer of resources in the durable goods sector to defense production may increase relative prices in some of the affected industries. Both the Department of Defense and private purchasers may have to pay more for goods from these industries. This premium is likely to increase with the size of the defense budget. 2. Increased demand may produce delays in the delivery of military goods. Delivery timetables that seem realistic today may become obsolete as producers try to accommodate both the defense buildup and the expansion in civilian investment. 3. Some crowding out of private investment may occur. Defense procurement uses many of the same physical resources needed for private investment, and the Defense Production Act gives defense priority in the market place. Some private firms may turn to foreign sources, while others may cancel or postpone plans for expansion. When we examine the details of the military budget, we find that the concentration of the planned military increases within procurement and research and development implies weapon production growth rates more rapid than those which occurred at the peak of the Vietnam buildup. Moreover, the present expansion occurs after a decade of steady reductions in the defense industrial base.
A private economic consulting organization, Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), pointed out:
... the combination of the increasing defense shares and the acceleration in growth rates raises concerns about industrial capabilities and spillover impacts on the economy. 1 DRI goes on to note that, with the implementation of significant investment 8 ) l programs in both plant and equipment and skilled labor forces, the problems of price pressures, bottlenecks and crowding out of civilian demand "could be constrained to isolated instances." See Table 5 for some examples of extremely rapid growth rates in future defense industry requirements. Over the six-year period 1982-87, doubledigit increases in annual output are shown for many industries, ranging from semiconductors to computers. The DRI conclusion is that the uncertainties about the capabilities of the defense industrial base and its linkages to other critical economic variables "will continue to cloud decisions regarding the defense budget."
A more recent Data Resources report is even less sanguine, pointing out that, since 1948, there has never before been a period of sustained growth in real defense spending such as that now planned. This more recent study concludes that the projected requirements for such large increases in defense output raise "obvious" questions about the ability of industry to meet them without adverse implications in terms of costs and leadtimes. 2 A variation of that theme appears in a recently released study by the U.S. Department of Commerce which reminds us that defense expenditures do not affect all industries equally, but have "highly concentrated industrial impacts." 3 
Defense expenditures do not affect all industries equally; they have "highly concentrated industrial impacts"
The Commerce Department examined a somewhat different time period than did DRI, but the conclusions are fairly similar. For most of the 58 major defense supplying industries which it studied, the Department of Commerce reported that existing capacity plus planned increases are sufficient to supply the projected military and civilian Table 6 ). How will all this balance out? The Commerce study reported that some of our basic metal processing industries will likely need to increase their dependence on foreign sources of supply in order to meet the stepped-up military demands. For example, the electrometallurgical products industry (which was specifically noted because of its "qualitative importance to Table  7 ). It is ironic to note the matter-of-fact way in which the Commerce Department reports such increased foreign dependence for some of the key defense-producing industries. On many other occasions, the hoary national security argument is trotted out to justify a host of subsidies to sectors of the economy far less closely related to defense output.
The point of these data should not be misunderstood. Drawing attention to the economic impacts of the contemplated expansion of military outlays does not call in question the desirablity of the expansion but, rather, its feasibility and cost in the 'S.
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